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‘A Local Terrorist Made Good’: The Callaghan Government and the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process, 1977-79 
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Abstract 
The British government had played an important role during the 1950s and 1960s as a 
mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, most notably through the development of Project Alpha 
between 1954 and 1956, and through the negotiation of United Nations Security Council 
resolution 242 in 1967. Between 1977 and 1979, British Prime Minister James Callaghan 
played a supporting role to US President Jimmy Carter as he negotiated the Camp David 
Accords of 1978. Callaghan adopted a pro-Israeli stance, cultivating close relations with the 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and defending Begin’s position over key issues, 
particularly his reluctance to remove settlements from the occupied territories. In this respect 
Callaghan’s government departed from established British policy, even abstaining over 
United Nations Security Council resolution 446 in March 1979 which condemned continuing 
Israeli settlement activity. This resulted in damage to Britain’s relations with moderate Arab 
states such as Egypt and Jordan. 
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During the 1950s and 1960s, Britain played an important, sometimes central role in 
efforts to broker peace between Israel and the Arab states. “Project Alpha”, the secret attempt 
to negotiate an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement between 1954 and 1956, was originally a 
British initiative, developed by Evelyn Shuckburgh, the assistant Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office responsible for the Middle East, albeit that it was carried forward during 1955 
as a joint Anglo-American undertaking.1 Alpha foundered early in 1956 in the face of the 
mutual suspicions between Cairo and Tel Aviv, but a decade later, the British role was once 
again significant when, in the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the British 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Lord Caradon, backed by Foreign Secretary George 
Brown, played the pivotal part in negotiating United Nations Security Council resolution 
242.2 Resolution 242, which laid down a “land for peace” formula under which Israel would 
withdraw from territories occupied in June 1967 in exchange for full peace with her Arab 
neighbours, provided the foundation for subsequent efforts to resolve the conflict. While US 
backing for British diplomacy was once again an essential element in this phase of the peace 
process, the position carved out by Foreign Secretary Brown over the key issues of Israeli 
withdrawal and the status of Jerusalem left Britain better placed than the United States to 
secure Arab backing for the passing of the resolution. Its unanimous adoption by the Security 
Council on 22 November 1967 was a signal success for Harold Wilson’s Labour Government 
against an otherwise grim international economic and political backdrop, which saw the 
government forced to devalue the Pound Sterling in November 1967 and subsequently to take 
the final decision in January 1968 to withdraw from all of Britain’s remaining military 
commitments East of Suez by 1971. 
In some respects, the successful passage of resolution 242 was a final hurrah both for 
the British ‘moment in the Middle East’ more generally,3 and specifically for its role as a key 
diplomatic broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process. While the Four-Power talks, involving 
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the United States, Soviet Union, France and Britain, theoretically continued to provide Britain 
with a leading role in diplomatic attempts to resolve the conflict during 1969 and 1970, in 
practice, the key initiatives during this period, such as the eponymous Rogers plan launched 
by the US Secretary of State William Rogers in December 1969, and the subsequent 
Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire initiative of June 1970, were American in origin.4 During the 
October 1973 war, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s attempts to entice the British 
government into sponsoring a ceasefire in place resolution in the UN Security Council on 12-
13 October were no more than a Machiavellian attempt to use the British for what Kissinger 
knew would be a quixotic mission given the unwillingness of the Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat to accept such terms at this stage of the war.5 British suspicions of Kissinger’s 
intentions were well founded, and the war ended with Anglo-American relations at a low ebb, 
amid US accusations of British diplomatic and political obstruction.6 Britain thus played no 
significant role in the post-war peace process this time round, with Kissinger keeping the 
negotiation of the successive disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel and Syria 
and Israel during 1974 and 1975 almost entirely in his own hands. 
On the face of things it might appear that there is similarly little to be said about the 
British role in the next phase of the peace process under the Carter Administration between 
1977 and 1979. William Quandt’s seminal study of the period, Camp David: Peacemaking 
and Politics, for example, contains not one single reference to Britain or to the British Prime 
Minister James Callaghan. Indeed the only British Prime Minister who is referred to in 
Quandt’s study is Neville Chamberlain, cited in his familiar role as the arch-exponent of 
appeasement.7 However, there is more substance to the British part in the peace process 
during this period than might appear at first sight. To begin with, in contrast to the tense state 
of Anglo-American relations during and after the 1973 war under the Heath government, 
relations between London and Washington under Callaghan and Carter were close and 
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relatively harmonious. While the scope of bilateral relations was obviously considerably 
broader than merely the personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the President, 
Carter and Callaghan did strike up a strong rapport early in the life of the new Administration 
which would subsequently prove to be of some importance in the high level diplomacy of the 
peace process. 
The first Callaghan-Carter phone conversation took place on 13 January 1977, shortly 
before Carter’s inauguration.8 Callaghan displayed all the familiar characteristics of any 
British Prime Minister in his first exchange with a new incumbent in the White House, 
eagerly seeking an early invitation to Washington but not wanting to appear too desperate. 
The British Presidency of the EEC during the first six months of 1977 gave Callaghan an 
extra card to play, allowing him to suggest that a visit to Washington before a planned 
meeting of European Heads of Government on 25 March, would allow him to report back to 
other EEC leaders on any issues of broader transatlantic concern. In the event Carter readily 
agreed to a visit in early March which proved to be a signal success for the Prime Minister. A 
character sketch of the new President prepared by the British Ambassador to the United 
States, Peter Ramsbotham, in advance of Callaghan’s visit noted that while Carter had moved 
naturally and rapidly into the responsibilities of office, his experience in international affairs 
was limited. Somewhat more ominously Ramsbotham observed that ‘Carter operates on a 
short fuse, and I find this, together with his streak of obstinacy mildly disturbing and I wonder 
how he will react to the inevitable frustrations of the Presidency.’ Nevertheless, Ramsbotham 
expressed the belief that Carter would ‘recognise and respect the Prime Minister’s great 
personal experience in international affairs.’9 In off-the-record answers during a briefing for 
American correspondents in London before his departure to Washington, Callaghan argued 
that he had a lot in common with the new President: ‘they shared the same initials, they had 
both been in the Navy, they were both Baptists and both had David Brown tractors.’10 How 
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far this eclectic collection of coincidences might provide the basis for a strong personal 
relationship remained to be seen, however. 
In the event, both the business meetings between Carter and Callaghan on 10 and 11 
March, and the accompanying social programme for the visit passed off smoothly and 
successfully. Carter broke the ice during his formal welcome for the Prime Minister on the 
White House South Lawn by paying generous homage to the “special relationship” between 
the two countries.11 Callaghan too displayed none of his predecessors Edward Heath or 
Harold Wilson’s squeamishness about this terminology: ‘I see no reason why we should 
refrain from using this term’, he noted in his speech during the state dinner. ‘It is not an 
exclusive relationship. It shuts no one out, and it does describe with accuracy the ease, the 
intimacy, the common feeling which Americans and Britons share with each other when we 
meet and talk….’12 
The Arab-Israeli conflict was one of a series of international issues addressed during 
the second of the two business meetings on 11 March 1977. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
reported on his recently concluded fact-finding tour of the region, while Carter for his part 
indicated that the United States ‘was prepared to make a very big effort over the Middle East 
this year’. In response to Callaghan’s question as to whether there was any way in which 
Britain could help Carter replied that it was ‘probably best for the Americans to continue to 
take the lead.’13 The exchange did not seem to presage any particular role for Britain or for 
Callaghan personally in the peace process. Nevertheless, the personal relationship between 
Carter and Callaghan was soon further buttressed by a successful return visit by the President 
to Britain in early May. Among a series of personal touches, Callaghan arranged an excursion 
for Carter to the North-East of England, during which he visited George Washington’s 
ancestral home and was accorded a rapturous welcome in Newcastle upon Tyne.14 
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In terms of progress over the Middle East despite Vance’s tour and a series of visits to 
Washington by leaders from the region, including King Hussein of Jordan and Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the peace process was to a large extent in abeyance during the spring 
awaiting the outcome of the Israeli Knesset election scheduled for 17 May. The election 
proved to be a political earthquake in Israel, with the Likud led by Menachem Begin for the 
first time emerging as the largest party in the Knesset, ending nearly three decades of 
unbroken rule by the Labour Alignment and its predecessors. While Carter had found the 
outgoing Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin relatively inflexible in his attitudes regarding the 
peace process,15 Begin’s reputation as the leading exponent of Zionist Revisionism, 
committed to retaining the West Bank which he regarded as part of Eretz Israel - the biblical 
Land of Israel, meant that the prospects for negotiations between Israel and the Arab states 
now appeared considerably worse.16 
The Begin victory came as a shock in both Washington and London. During a phone 
conversation on 21 May the President and Prime Minister discussed its implications. Both 
men agreed that the best policy was to attempt to reassure Arab leaders and to counsel calm. 
But the most interesting part of the discussion concerned Begin himself and the implications 
of his election for the pro-Israel lobbies in both the United States and Britain. Callaghan, 
unlike Carter, had met Begin and knew the strength of his ideological convictions. 
Commenting on his meeting with Begin in February 1974, Callaghan noted that ‘he fought 
very bitterly against us and has the respect that old enemies frequently have. But he is 
extremely hard line. It was the most confrontable conversation I had the whole of the time I 
was in the Middle East.’17 The reference to Begin’s past as the leader between 1943 and 1948 
of the Irgun terrorist organisation which had fought against the British in Palestine indicated 
one impediment any British leader would face in dealing with him. Indeed, Callaghan’s 
successor Margaret Thatcher never overcame her instinctive hostility to Begin as the 
 8 
mastermind behind the King David Hotel bombing of July 1946.18 But it was perhaps 
Callaghan’s unwitting neologism in describing his conversation with Begin as “confrontable” 
which best summed up the challenge to be faced in dealing with the new Israeli Prime 
Minister. Meetings with Begin were indeed often a combination of “confrontational” and 
“uncomfortable” for his interlocutors, particularly for President Carter. Commenting on some 
of Begin’s statements in relation to settlements on the West Bank, which he always referred to 
as “Judea and Samaria” in order to assert a notional historical claim, Carter described them as 
‘unwarranted’ and commented that ‘he could at least have kept his mouth shut for a few 
weeks’. But here again, Callaghan drew on his experience of Begin to put his position in 
perspective: ‘but it is unrealistic to expect him to do so. He has been saying this for thirty 
years. This is where you are going to be really right up against it with him.’ Callaghan’s 
insight drew a positive response from Carter, who commented that he would welcome his 
‘advice on how I should pursue our common purpose. I would certainly not consider that an 
intrusion but a welcome exhibition of friendship.’ 
In terms of the reaction of pro-Israel constituencies in both the United States and 
Britain to Begin’s election, both men offered a similar analysis. Carter observed that his main 
task was to keep with him key members of Congress and the Jewish community, 98% of 
whom had been loyal to the Labour Alignment and had very little relationship with Begin at 
all. He expressed what in hindsight appears to have been the rather naïve hope that if the 
peace process presented a choice between backing Begin and ensuring the security of Israel, 
then Israel’s supporters would choose the latter. Callaghan for his part noted that he had a 
number of friends among Jewish leaders in Britain, but that he had ‘kept away from them this 
week whilst they are suffering from shock’. But their basic position was likely to remain that 
they would support Israel. ‘I would guess that if Begin is intransigent that this will split the 
Jews both in your country and mine’, he observed. 
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Callaghan’s reference to his friends among Jewish leaders points to another aspect of 
his government’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict which merits further discussion. 
Callaghan had perhaps found his earlier confrontation with Begin all the more surprising since 
his own fundamental position was highly sympathetic to Israel. Among British Prime 
Ministers probably only his immediate predecessor Harold Wilson and Tony Blair in later 
years would rival him in this regard. To some extent Callaghan’s position was a product of the 
extensive links between the British Labour Party and Israel which had been built up during 
the 1950s and 1960s, most notably through the Socialist International organisation, but also 
between the Trades Union movements, and as a result of the backing of the British Jewish 
community for Labour during these years.19 But Callaghan himself had also staked out a pro-
Israel position at key junctures, most notably when, during the October 1973 war, as Shadow 
Foreign Secretary he had criticised the Conservative government for being too pro-Arab as a 
result its refusal to condemn the Arab attack and its decision to impose an arms embargo on 
Israel as well as on the Arab states.20  
While some commentators have argued that Harold Wilson’s resignation as Prime 
Minister and Callaghan’s subsequent victory in the Labour leadership election ushered in a 
new era in terms of British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Foreign Office 
taking the opportunity to institute a much less pro-Israeli line than that advocated by Wilson, 
the evidence which will be presented here suggests otherwise.21 Indeed, Callaghan’s approach 
to key issues such as Israeli settlement-building in the occupied territories was to prove in 
practice if anything even more sympathetic to the Israeli position than that of his predecessor 
Wilson. What role Callaghan’s own ancestry played in shaping his personal convictions 
regarding Israel during his term of office as Prime Minister is a moot point. While it is worth 
noting that his paternal grandmother, Elizabeth Bernstein, was Jewish, Callaghan himself 
appears only to have discovered this fact in 1976 as a result of a tabloid newspaper article 
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published once he became Prime Minister.22 In any event it is clear that in common with other 
Prime Ministers who had previously held the post of Foreign Secretary, such as Anthony 
Eden and Harold Macmillan, Callaghan adopted a proactive personal approach to Middle East 
diplomacy. His tenure as Foreign Secretary had also made him suspicious of what he saw as 
the Foreign Office’s ingrained pro-Arabism.23   
Beyond Callaghan’s personal diplomacy, events during the summer of 1977 pointed 
towards two further respects in which the British role in the peace process was to prove of 
some significance. The first was the Middle East declaration issued by EEC leaders on 29 
June 1977 during the European Council meeting in London which marked the close of the 
British presidency. This went beyond the language of resolution 242 in also calling for ‘the 
need for a homeland for the Palestinian people’.24 In this respect it echoed the language 
already used by President Carter, when he had responded to a question during a town hall 
meeting at Clinton, Massachusetts on 16 March 1977, by stating that ‘there has to be a 
homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.’25 
The EEC was subsequently to play a much more significant role in the diplomacy of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, most notably through its landmark Venice Declaration of June 1980. But 
despite having presided over the issuing of the London declaration in June 1977, the British 
government remained relatively dismissive of the EEC’s role at this stage. Foreign Secretary 
David Owen confided during a discussion with the Prime Minister and US Secretary of State 
Vance that: ‘the Nine were very insecure on the Middle East. If things were handled with the 
Nine, the French leaked everything to the Arabs, the Dutch leaked to the Israelis and the 
Italians were in any case incapable of keeping anything quiet.’26 No doubt this was something 
of a caricature of Middle East discussions within the EEC, but it did point to the fact that there 
was a considerable diversity of opinion over the Arab-Israeli conflict. This made it difficult to 
forge a common position. Nevertheless the British position within the EEC, and, from Israel’s 
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perspective, its ability to help block any unwelcome pro-Arab initiatives sponsored by the 
French, was an added dimension of the Callaghan government’s diplomatic role.27 
Callaghan’s prime ministerial papers also point towards another area in which the 
British government held a privileged position in the diplomacy of the peace process. London 
served as an important venue for the covert diplomacy of the conflict. In late August the 
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan scheduled an impromptu trip to London. The public 
explanation for his visit was that he was coming to meet leaders of the Jewish community and 
to deal with Foreign Ministry matters, which was taken by the Foreign Office as code to mean 
delivering a rebuke to the Israeli Ambassador in London who had made negative comments at 
a private dinner about the likely duration of Begin’s government. But Callaghan was 
evidently aware from other sources that this was not the real reason for his trip. Dayan’s visit 
coincided with the presence in London of King Hussein of Jordan who maintained a property 
there. Callaghan annotated a dispatch from Cairo, which referred to the diplomacy of UN 
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, with the question: ‘has the FCO any idea what passed 
between Hussein and Dayan if indeed they met? I would like to know before I see 
Waldheim.’28 The reply from the Foreign Office confirmed Callaghan’s suspicions: ‘we now 
know that there was another reason for his visit. We are arranging for a report [section deleted 
and retained under section 3(4)] to be sent to you.’29 Callaghan’s Private Secretary 
subsequently replied that ‘the Prime Minister was interested to see the report you mention’, 
although no copy was evidently retained in his files, presumably because it was immediately 
returned to its point of origin.30 While the redactions mean that no certain conclusion can be 
drawn, it is highly likely this was a Security Service (MI5) report on the meeting between 
Hussein and Dayan. 
Since 1963, Hussein had begun meeting Israeli representatives at the home of his 
London physician, Dr Emmanuel Herbert. Dr Herbert’s home was certainly not the only 
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venue for these covert meetings, many of which took place in the region, but it was the most 
significant overseas venue. According to one source Dr Herbert had originally been 
recommended to Hussein and his family in the 1950s by MI5 as a man of discretion who 
treated many foreign dignitaries. The fact that he was also an ardent Zionist meant that it was 
relatively easy for officials at the Israeli Embassy to cultivate contact with him as well.31 How 
far MI5 was able to monitor the subsequent contacts between Hussein and Israeli 
representatives established through Dr Herbert over the years is unclear from the available 
sources. The former CIA station chief in Amman, Jack O’Connell, later expressed the firm 
conviction that if the British intelligence services had not bugged Dr Herbert’s home and 
surgery, then they were not doing their job properly.32 But exactly what form such 
surveillance might have taken cannot be stated with certainty from the available sources. It is 
highly likely, though, that the report provided to Callaghan on the Hussein-Dayan meeting at 
Dr Herbert’s home on 22 August 1977 came from the Security Service. Callaghan thus had 
privileged information in his hands about the covert diplomacy of the conflict which was not 
available even to President Carter (unless of course it was shared through Anglo-American 
intelligence channels). In any event, on this occasion, the Hussein-Dayan meeting did not 
produce a breakthrough in the peace process, with both men rehearsing largely familiar and 
unyielding positions.33 
As the EEC declaration on the Middle East and Carter’s statement during the Clinton 
town hall meeting had made clear, the issues at stake in the peace process by 1977 went 
beyond resolution 242 and its state-based “land for peace” formula in one key respect. The 
development of the Palestinian national movement as represented by the PLO in the decade 
since the June 1967 war meant that the Palestinian question could no longer be treated as one 
of merely the requirement for a settlement for the refugees as reflected in the terms of 
resolution 242. Instead, the question of Palestinian self-determination was now firmly on the 
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diplomatic agenda. In truth the use of the term “homeland” in both the EEC and Carter 
statements fudged this issue. The term avoided promising the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, which would incense the Israeli government and its supporters, while indicating that the 
right of the Palestinians to self-determination had to be acknowledged. Callaghan himself 
jumped on the bandwagon when, in a speech delivered on 23 October to a special meeting of 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews held to mark the 60th anniversary of the Balfour 
Declaration, he also referred to the need for a Palestinian homeland. However, when 
questioned by former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban during a private meeting on 7 
November as to what he had actually meant by this reference, the Prime Minister replied that 
‘speaking very frankly, he did not really know what he had meant; nor did others who used 
the same expression. He would like to see a Palestinian/Jordan axis.’34 In effect, then, in 
Callaghan’s view, any exercise of Palestinian self-determination could not be unfettered and 
would have to result in the confederation of a Palestinian entity with Jordan. 
The importance of Jordan in Callaghan’s thinking was mirrored in the effort he also 
invested in cultivating relations with King Hussein during 1978. There was a longer pedigree 
to the close bilateral relationship between Britain and Jordan, and the King had also been a 
pivotal figure in the British negotiation of resolution 242 a decade earlier.35 But during 1978 
Callaghan was to devote a significant effort to trying to overcome the King’s doubts about the 
direction taken by the peace process in the wake of Egyptian President Sadat’s historic visit to 
Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset on 20 November 1977. The Sadat visit indeed marked 
a most significant watershed in the process, with the Egyptian President symbolically 
abandoning the Arab taboo on openly setting foot in Israel. However, the visit also signalled 
Sadat’s abandonment of the multilateral peace process aimed at re-convening the Geneva 
Middle East peace conference which had met briefly, then adjourned, in December 1973. 
Given that reconvening the Geneva conference had been the main focus of US diplomacy 
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during 1977, Sadat’s visit necessitated a significant rethinking of strategy in Washington. It 
also put other Arab states, particularly Jordan, in a very difficult position. Arab leaders 
including King Hussein now feared that Sadat was intent on pursuing a bilateral peace 
settlement with Israel, abandoning Arab solidarity. 
In the wake of Sadat’s visit, Callaghan engaged in an intensive round of Middle East 
diplomacy between December 1977 and March 1978. While the Prime Minister did not 
contemplate supplanting the United States and President Carter as the main great power 
sponsor of the peace process, the model of what had taken place in the autumn of 1967 may 
well have been in his mind. Then, by cultivating close relations with all of the key players, 
and by developing a distinctive position on the key issues, Britain had been uniquely placed to 
step in and sponsor resolution 242 when US diplomacy foundered in early November 1967. It 
was not beyond the bounds of possibility that such a role might open up for Britain once again 
a decade later. However, in contrast to the autumn of 1967, when Brown and Caradon had 
focused their efforts on wooing the key Arab states, during the winter of 1977-8, the main 
focus of Callaghan’s efforts, which might have seemed most unlikely in view of his 
comments to Carter about his previous “confrontable” meeting with Begin, was on cultivating 
relations with the Israeli Prime Minister. Although Callaghan never articulated a clear 
rationale for this approach, it is possible that he believed the main obstacle to progress in the 
peace process was likely to lie in Begin’s refusal to make concessions. So, successfully 
cultivating Begin might provide the maximum dividend in terms of advances in the 
negotiations.  
On Sunday 4 December 1977, Callaghan held a long meeting with Begin at 10 
Downing Street.36 Begin’s visit had originally been scheduled to take place between 20-23 
November but had to be postponed in the light of President Sadat’s dramatic decision to fly to 
Jerusalem to speak to the Knesset. The invitation for the visit had been issued by Callaghan in 
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late August and accepted with alacrity by Begin, who, according to Ambassador Sir John 
Mason in Tel Aviv, had expressed his gratitude ‘in emotional terms’.37 No doubt this was the 
result of the complex history of Begin’s personal relationship with Britain, which on the one 
hand he regarded with gratitude as the author of the Balfour Declaration which had laid the 
foundation for the creation of Israel, and on the other with hostility as the mandatory power 
which had endeavoured to block Jewish immigration to Palestine and frustrate Zionist goals 
during the final phase of the mandate. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban had 
described matters in an earlier conversation with Callaghan, Begin’s attitude towards Britain 
was ‘highly equivocal – a combination of hatred and admiration.’38 In view of Begin’s 
background as the former leader of the Irgun which had carried out terrorist attacks against 
British forces and civilians in Palestine, Callaghan’s invitation was controversial and resulted 
in a large number of letters of complaint from the public. These included a protest from the 
last British Governor of Palestine, General Sir Alan Cunningham, which Callaghan answered 
personally.39 The distaste with which Begin continued to be viewed in official circles was 
mirrored in the character sketch of him prepared by the Foreign Office, which described him 
with no small irony as ‘a local terrorist made good’.40 Begin’s recognition of the fact that the 
Prime Minister had taken something of a political risk in inviting him to London was no doubt 
part of the reason why from the outset, on this occasion, he seemed much more well disposed 
towards Callaghan, taking him into his confidence by giving him advance information about 
two sets of secret talks which had been arranged between Israel and Egypt to address security 
issues and political problems. During their meeting, he also treated Callaghan to an extended 
explanation as to why the pre-1967 frontiers of Israel were indefensible. Begin further 
acknowledged that there was a problem of what he called the “Palestinian Arabs”, a term he 
insisted on using instead of “Palestinians”. But he claimed this was not a problem of territory 
‘given the great expanse of Arab lands and the number of sovereign Arab states’. The 
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message was clear: whatever solution Begin now developed for the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories it would not involve anything which might lead to statehood. What is 
most striking about Callaghan’s reply is his adoption and use throughout the rest of the 
conversation of Begin’s term “Palestinian Arabs” instead of “Palestinians”, a term Begin 
himself employed in order to indicate that the Palestinians were not a separate people 
deserving of self-determination. It is possible that Callaghan did not understand the full 
implications of his adoption of this terminology but in a conflict where language was 
recruited by all parties in support of their claims, and each and every comment was carefully 
parsed for political bias, this was a significant signal. Begin, according to Ambassador Mason, 
‘derived much satisfaction’ from this semantic victory, particularly from the Prime Minister’s 
public use of the term ‘Palestinian Arabs’ during a speech he made at a dinner hosted by 
Begin at the Savoy Hotel that evening.41 
Begin also raised the issue of the position of the Nine regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and made a bid for British support in preventing the French from securing any further 
statement about the need for Israeli withdrawal, which he argued might prejudice the 
forthcoming negotiations. Callaghan was forthcoming in this respect as well, indicating that 
he did not envisage any further discussion of the Middle East at the European Council and 
expressing the hope that in due course the Nine might actually be able ‘to work out something 
that could help Israel’s security’. Callaghan was true to his word, persuading fellow EEC 
leaders during a private discussion after dinner on 5 December that no public statement or 
declaration on the Middle East should be made for the time being.42 While areas of 
disagreement remained between Begin and Callaghan over the shape of a comprehensive 
peace agreement, overall, the tone and atmosphere of their meeting was warm and friendly, a 
far cry from Callaghan’s previous meeting with Begin in 1974. 
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Just over a week later Begin followed up on the meeting by telephoning Callaghan to 
give him advance notice of what became known as the “Begin Plan”, a proposal for 
administrative autonomy for the Palestinians living in the occupied territories.43 The plan did 
not involve Israeli withdrawal and proposed leaving the question of sovereignty in abeyance 
for a five year transitional period at the end of which there would be further negotiations over 
the final status of the territories. While Begin did not offer details of the plan over the phone, 
it is significant that he decided to call Callaghan before flying to the United States to discuss 
the plan with Carter. Once again, the tone of the call was very warm with Callaghan 
describing Begin’s decision to move quickly and take the initiative as ‘wonderful’ and Begin 
for his part enthusing over the ‘wonderful’ London days of his visit a week earlier. The Israeli 
Prime Minister also made highly complimentary remarks about Foreign Secretary David 
Owen: ‘he is a wonderful man and a good Foreign Secretary if I may say so.’ Evidently he 
also regarded Owen as sympathetic to his position.44 This was once more a far cry from the 
“confrontable” exchange of 1974. Indeed, Foreign Secretary Owen subsequently described 
Begin’s phone call as a ‘remarkable development’ in a personal telegram to Ambassador Peter 
Jay in Washington.45 
Callaghan’s budding relationship with Begin also served to underline the limits of 
EEC solidarity. Officials in the Foreign Office recommended caution in revealing any of the 
substance of the exchanges to French President Giscard d’Estaing, with whom Callaghan was 
scheduled to meet later the same day, since ‘the French might use any information we give 
them against us with the Arabs or … they might leak the information for their own 
purposes.’46 Callaghan therefore confined himself to vague generalisations about the purpose 
of Begin’s visit to Washington in his ensuing conversation with Giscard, but this did not stop 
the French President from observing that ‘the UK now seemed to be leaning markedly 
towards the side of the Israelis. France for her part endeavoured to be even-handed.’ 
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Interestingly, Callaghan did not seek to deny the allegation, and instead merely deflected it by 
referring to the ‘close historical links between the UK and Israel and the particularly close 
links between the British Labour Party and the Israelis.’47 In any event Begin was pleased by 
Callaghan’s successful blocking operation in the EEC, commenting in a further phone 
exchange on 15 December that ‘I understand that in Brussels you helped very much’ and that 
the decision taken at the Prime Minister’s instigation not to make any further EEC statement 
was a ‘very good result’.48 
 While Begin was in Washington between 16-18 December for the purpose of outlining 
his peace proposals, Carter and Callaghan also spoke by phone. With Begin due to stop off in 
London on his way back from the United States it made sense for Callaghan to ensure that he 
was fully briefed on the substance of the President’s talks with the Israeli leader. Callaghan 
described himself during their conversation as operating ‘in a supporting role’ and Carter 
promised to send him a full account of his talks with Begin once they had concluded. In the 
meantime Carter observed that although Begin’s ideas were ‘not completely unreasonable’, 
they would not be enough to satisfy the Arabs.49 The summary of the talks subsequently sent 
by Carter indicated that the main areas of disagreement between Begin and Sadat were likely 
to be over the continuation of Israeli settlements in the Sinai, the Israeli security role in the 
West Bank, and the status of Jerusalem. His general impression was that while Begin’s Sinai 
proposals would be substantially acceptable to Sadat, the West Bank-Gaza proposal had ‘a 
long way to go before Sadat and other Arabs can accept it’.50 In the event, this proved to be 
much too optimistic an interpretation of Sadat’s likely view of the Sinai element of Begin’s 
proposals. While both Carter and Callaghan operated on the assumption that it would be the 
West Bank which would prove to be the key sticking point in negotiations, it was in fact 
Begin’s insistence on retaining Israeli settlements in Egyptian territory in the Sinai which was 
to prove the most intractable obstacle to agreement over the coming months. This misreading 
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of the Egyptian position was to contribute to Callaghan’s subsequent mishandling of relations 
with President Sadat. 
 In terms of Callaghan’s handling of Begin, Carter suggested that it would be helpful if 
he could urge the Israeli Prime Minister to be more flexible. Callaghan acknowledged this 
suggestion in his response to the President.51 During his meeting with Begin itself, however, 
flattery and hyperbole loomed rather larger in Callaghan’s approach than the urging of 
flexibility on the Israeli leader. The minutes record that ‘the Prime Minister said that he found 
Mr Begin’s approach remarkable and imaginative. He very much welcomed its constructive 
nature. It was the best approach to peace which anybody had seen for many years.’52 The 
dangers inherent in this type of statement were reflected in Begin’s account to Callaghan of 
President Carter’s response to his plan for the West Bank. According to him, ‘President Carter 
had accepted the plan for Judea and Samaria without qualification’, and ‘had agreed that the 
plan constituted a fair basis for negotiations.’ But while it was true that Carter, in trying to 
bolster his personal relations with Begin, had tried to be as positive about the plan as possible, 
describing it as ‘constructive’, he had not gone so far as to endorse it in the terms Begin 
described.53 Evidently the Israeli Prime Minister was selective in how he chose to remember 
such exchanges. 
A further illustration of this point was provided by the way Begin had chosen to use 
comments made by Foreign Secretary Owen, during his previous 4 December meeting with 
Callaghan and Owen in London, in his subsequent talks with President Carter. In arguing the 
case for his plan for the West Bank, Begin had told Carter during their first meeting that ‘I 
would like to be able to say to Sadat that you see this as a fair basis for negotiations… If he 
agrees to no Palestinian state, and if the US agrees, and if Great Britain agrees, as Mr Owen 
said, this can be the only solution.’54 He returned to this point during his second meeting with 
Carter, arguing that ‘British Foreign Secretary Owen said that the West Bank would 
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obviously have to be demilitarized, and therefore it could not be a state. It is a contradiction in 
terms to talk of demilitarization and a state.’55 However, a comparison with the record of 
Begin’s 4 December conversation with Callaghan and Owen in London shows that what 
Owen had actually said was that ‘the Government had never committed themselves to a 
Palestinian state partly because demilitarisation seemed essential and this would be hard to 
enforce for a state.’56 But the nuances were lost in Begin’s version and the British position 
was represented as clear cut opposition to a Palestinian state on the basis that demilitarisation 
was incompatible with statehood. So Callaghan would have been well advised to choose his 
words more carefully in giving such a fulsome overall welcome to Begin’s proposals during 
their 20 December meeting. There were qualifications in Callaghan’s detailed response to 
Begin’s plan, and he did counsel ‘a measure of flexibility on the Israeli side’, but these 
nuances risked being ignored by the Israeli Prime Minister who tended to seize selectively on 
supportive comments.57 
Callaghan followed up on the meeting by reporting its contents to Carter. While he 
avoided the hyperbole he had used with Begin himself, he did tell the President that ‘I have 
modified my view since hearing Begin explain the details of the plan and I am more 
favourably inclined than I was when I sent you my original reactions.’58 Begin’s sense of 
Callaghan’s sympathy and his desire to keep him fully informed was in evidence once again 
when he called the Prime Minister immediately after his talks with President Sadat at 
Ismailiya on Christmas Day 1977. In truth, the talks were a failure, but Begin put a positive 
gloss on them, describing them as ‘quite successful’. Once again Begin’s regard for Foreign 
Secretary David Owen was in evidence as he commented ‘I like the name as I told you and 
the fellow.’59 
Callaghan followed up immediately on the conversation with Begin by placing a call 
to Egyptian President Sadat an hour later. His purpose was evidently to compare the Egyptian 
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leader’s account of the Ismailiya talks with that which he had just received from Begin. In 
fact, Callaghan had a longer-standing personal relationship with Sadat, which dated back to 
his time as Shadow-Foreign Secretary. In his memoirs Callaghan recalled that his first 
meeting with Sadat, during his Middle East tour in February 1974, had ‘marked the beginning 
of a close relationship’.60 Callaghan painted a highly sympathetic portrait of the Egyptian 
President, describing him as a ‘serious and sensible far-seeing man’.61 While he noted that 
Sadat had his faults, including a tendency to belittle other Arab leaders especially King 
Hussein of Jordan, Sadat ‘was a man who thought on a large scale and his historic and 
courageous decision to visit Jerusalem was the most significant event that had happened since 
the establishment of the state of Israel.’62 In terms of their personal relationship, Callaghan 
believed that Sadat came to ‘rely on my discretion and know that my views and advice were 
wholly disinterested.’63 The result, Callaghan argued, was that Sadat kept in regular contact 
with him, particularly during the Camp David process. 
During their phone call on 26 December, Sadat indicated that ‘I need your help – I 
mean, in the near future and I am sure that you will give us this help.’64 While Sadat was not 
specific as to exactly what help he needed from Callaghan he did refer to a possible British 
role both in the peace process and in the guaranteeing of any settlement which might 
subsequently be agreed. Sadat also put a positive gloss on the state of negotiations, indicating 
that he remained optimistic that a comprehensive settlement could be achieved. 
In addition to his own personal channel of communications to Sadat, Callaghan had 
another considerable asset at his disposal in judging the approach and state of mind of the 
Egyptian leader. In a concrete example of the kinds of personal ties which contributed to the 
diplomatic fabric of the Anglo-American “special relationship”, the British Ambassador in 
Egypt, Willie Morris, had a long-standing personal friendship, dating back to the early 1950s, 
with his US counterpart, Ambassador Hermann Eilts. The fruit of this relationship as far as 
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the British were concerned was that Eilts shared both his extensive personal observations of 
Sadat, and his views of US policy towards the peace process, in an exceptionally candid 
fashion with Morris. The judgement of the FCO was that Eilts probably frequently exceeded 
his authority in passing on this information to Morris. Hence, Morris’s despatches from Cairo 
were given very restricted distribution by the FCO to protect their source. Callaghan benefited 
from seeing these despatches which were copied to his office.65 
As a follow up to his phone conversation with Sadat, and in a bid to lend his support to 
US efforts to prevent the peace process from stalling, Callaghan arranged to meet Sadat at his 
home in Aswan overlooking the Nile on 13 January 1978. This was to prove a crucial meeting 
to the extent that it fully exposed the Prime Minister’s personal sympathies in the peace 
process. In advance of the meeting two contrasting despatches crossed Callaghan’s desk. The 
first was a telegram from the British Ambassador to Israel, Sir John Mason, in which he 
reported on a meeting with Begin. The Israeli Prime Minister had conveyed a request to 
Callaghan that when he met Sadat at Aswan he should persuade him that the Israeli proposals 
over the Sinai settlements represented ‘a far-reaching and fair compromise’.66 The second was 
a telegram from Ambassador Morris in Cairo, in which he made an impassioned plea for 
Prime Ministerial action: ‘I submit that if ever there is to be a time and an issue on which to 
make use of our credit with the Israel government it is now, in trying to avoid a failure of 
President Sadat’s initiative or equally unsatisfactory a transient success which perpetuates the 
Arab/Israel problem for another generation.’ Morris went further arguing that ‘if at this 
juncture either Mr Begin or President Sadat has to be disappointed by us, there is surely no 
question who it should be.’67 
But Callaghan evidently thought otherwise. In an extraordinary meeting the Prime 
Minister proceeded both to abandon the fundamental principles of British policy towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and to misjudge completely the mood and priorities of the Egyptian 
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leader, a man with whom he claimed to have established a close personal relationship. 
Callaghan arrived at the meeting with two mistaken premises. The first was that the dispute 
over Sinai settlements was an issue of secondary importance. The second was that Sadat could 
be persuaded to show “flexibility” over it. But the settlements question was of fundamental 
importance to Sadat. Agreeing either to allow the Israeli settlements to remain, or to redraw 
the international border to accommodate them, would have represented a fundamental 
sacrifice of Egyptian sovereignty. It would also have represented the negation of the terms of 
the British-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution 242 which referred to the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. 
While Sadat made clear repeatedly that the retention of the Israeli settlements was 
totally unacceptable to him, Callaghan in effect acted as Begin’s advocate by referring to his 
domestic difficulties: ‘Mr Begin could not agree that the settlements should be razed to the 
ground. He would be turned out of office.’ In a decisive exchange, Callaghan asked how far 
the settlements were inside the border. When Sadat replied 2-3 kilometres, the Prime Minister 
‘exclaimed that surely he was not going to let the initiative break down over 2-3 kilometres of 
desert in the Middle East. Yes! said President Sadat. It is a matter of principle.’ The exchange 
continued in the same vein: ‘the Prime Minister commented that President Sadat seemed to be 
saying that he really was prepared to let the peace initiative fail. President Sadat commented 
that Egypt had lived within internationally recognised boundaries through thousands of years 
and he was not going to depart from them now.’ This part of the exchange concluded with 
Callaghan observing ‘he heard what President Sadat had said and regretted it.’68  
In describing the meeting during a phone conversation with President Carter the 
following day, Callaghan commented that ‘Sadat was in a very emotional state at times 
yesterday.’69 But even viewed dispassionately Callaghan had subjected Sadat to unwarranted 
pressure. Moreover, his advocacy of Begin’s case regarding the Sinai settlements represented 
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the abandonment of a long-standing principle of British policy. While Carter was 
complimentary about the Prime Minister’s role, joking at the start of their call that ‘it looks 
like you have got the whole Middle East thing straightened out for us’, there is no doubt that 
Callaghan’s relations with Sadat had been significantly damaged by their Aswan meeting. 
According to a report from Morris, US Ambassador Eilts had learned that the Prime 
Minister’s attitude on the Sinai settlements had ‘depressed Sadat’.70 
It was at this juncture that Callaghan came closest to embarking on a significant, high 
profile initiative of his own in the peace process. In a meeting with senior Foreign Office 
officials on 30 January, the Prime Minister floated the idea that during President Sadat’s 
forthcoming visit to Washington DC, he might himself travel to Jerusalem ‘to act as a channel 
of communication between President Carter and Mr Begin’.71 He was only narrowly deflected 
from his purpose by Michael Weir, the Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office 
responsible for the Middle East, who pointed out that ‘it might be difficult, in this situation, 
for the Prime Minister to avoid being cast by Arab opinion and the media as the advocate of 
the Israelis.’ In the face of his officials’ sound advice, Callaghan reluctantly accepted that 
‘there might be too many risks involved in going to Jerusalem.’ 
The Prime Minister had to content himself instead with a meeting with Sadat during a 
stopover at Heathrow Airport on his return journey from the United States. Once again Sadat 
reiterated his perfectly reasonable insistence that ‘security could not be based on the 
acquisition of neighbours’ land’. But apparently Callaghan had not learned from his previous 
exchange with the Egyptian President, stating that ‘on the issue of the Sinai settlements… he 
was not completely at one with the President…. He had no doubt of the justice of Egypt’s 
insistence on its rightful sovereignty but some flexibility would be needed if Mr Begin made 
his great leap forward on the West Bank issues.’ What seemed to be implied here was a trade. 
Begin was to be persuaded to accept that resolution 242 applied to all fronts including the 
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West Bank in return for the sacrifice by Egypt of territory in the Sinai. It is hardly surprising 
that the Egyptian delegation rejected the proposal, with the Speaker of the National Assembly 
Sayid Marei commenting that ‘if Mr Begin’s political commitments were at issue that was his 
problem, but the Sinai settlements were a different issue from those on the West Bank.’ 
The damage done to Anglo-Egyptian relations and Britain’s credibility as an honest 
broker in the peace process was not apparent to Callaghan. This much is clear from the Prime 
Minister’s response to Ambassador Willie Morris’s valedictory despatch from Cairo sent a 
year later in the wake of the Camp David summit. In the course of reviewing his service in 
Cairo, and with the freedom to speak his mind which his imminent retirement from the 
Foreign Office brought, Morris wrote that Western governments had failed Sadat from the 
start by treating Egyptian requirements as being of a lesser order than those of Israel. ‘Instead 
of support, he got unstinted [sic] praise and admiration for his statesmanship – and was urged 
to be flexible and give more. It is no secret in Cairo that British ministers twice went even 
beyond President Carter in urging President Sadat to make concessions on Sinai settlements 
and boundaries, on which our long-established policy could not have been clearer.’72 On the 
covering letter to Morris’s despatch Callaghan annotated the words: ‘it is a pity to have to 
have to wait for valedictory despatches to get these strong opinions expressed. What is he 
referring to on page 4?’ The response from the Foreign Office left no doubt that it was the 
Prime Minister’s own statements at Aswan and at Heathrow to which Morris had referred.73 
If Sadat was one Arab leader whom Callaghan pressed to make unrealistic concessions 
to satisfy Israeli requirements, King Hussein of Jordan was another. To be sure, Callaghan 
was not alone in this respect since President Carter’s mishandling of relations with Hussein 
represented a key flaw in his administration’s diplomatic strategy, which resulted ultimately 
in the failure of the framework for a comprehensive peace in the region agreed at Camp 
David. On 22 February, Callaghan entertained Hussein to dinner at 10 Downing Street, the 
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first of three such meetings during the course of 1978. In his memoirs Callaghan referred to 
Hussein as ‘a courageous leader who steered his country skilfully through the Middle East 
labyrinth’.74 These skills were much in evidence in the King’s handling of his exchanges with 
the Prime Minister.  When Callaghan asked Hussein whether the Begin Plan could not be 
built on to provide an acceptable basis for negotiations in which Jordan could take part, the 
King was unequivocal in his response: ‘he saw no possibility of this.’ From Jordan’s point of 
view it was essential that Israel committed itself in advance to withdraw from the West Bank, 
abandon its claim on sovereignty and offer an assurance of self-determination for the 
Palestinians. The Begin Plan was designed to avoid all of these outcomes. Hussein’s 
fundamental point was that it was essential to know what the outcome of any transitional 
period would be before he could agree to participate in it. On several occasions he referred to 
being ‘deeply afraid of a re-run of the Resolution 242 saga’ in which the principles for peace 
had been laid down, but the great powers, principally the United States, had not followed up 
on their implementation.75 
Callaghan’s meeting with Hussein was followed almost immediately by a visit to 
Israel and Jordan between 25 and 27 February on the part of Foreign Secretary Owen.76 As 
befitted Prime Minister Begin’s favourite Foreign Secretary, Owen was given a warm 
welcome in Israel and held meetings with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister 
Ezer Weizman, and the Prime Minister himself. In Jordan, Owen held a meeting with Crown 
Prince Hassan in King Hussein’s absence. But despite this intensive British diplomacy there 
was little to show from the visit in terms of concrete progress in the peace process. Callaghan 
followed up on Owen’s visit with a letter to King Hussein summarising the Foreign 
Secretary’s observations from his trip and expressing his conviction that ‘Jordan can make a 
decisive contribution to this effort.’77 But over the coming months Callaghan himself drew 
back somewhat from the active diplomatic role he had played during the winter of 1977-78. 
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He continued to act as a sounding board for President Carter to vent his frustrations over the 
peace process, particularly regarding his meetings with Begin. Callaghan’s visit to 
Washington on 23 March, for instance, followed immediately in the wake of a visit by Begin 
and he found the President more keen to unburden himself about the ‘previous two days’ 
harassment’ than to discuss the international economic issues which were the ostensible 
purpose of the meeting.78 
In July 1978, Britain moved back briefly into central focus in the peace process when 
an Israeli-Egyptian conference was convened by the Carter administration at Leeds Castle, a 
stately home in Kent. But Callaghan’s role here was confined to vetoing on security grounds 
the original American plan to hold the meeting at the Churchill Hotel in central London.79 The 
subsequent summit between Sadat and Begin called by President Carter at Camp David 
between 5 and 17 September coincided with another visit to London by King Hussein, whom 
Callaghan was scheduled to meet once again on 13 September. The day before the meeting, 
Callaghan sent an urgent message to Carter offering his help if there were any questions 
which the President wanted him to put to the King resulting from the summit discussions.80 
However, when the King arrived for their meeting at 1630 the following afternoon no 
response from Washington had yet arrived and the two leaders were forced to conduct their 
discussion without any up to date information on the summit proceedings.81 This was a 
reflection both of the chaotic nature of the summit itself and of the fact that Carter had 
neglected communications with Hussein. It was symptomatic of this neglect that the response 
from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, asking the Prime Minister to counsel 
Hussein to show ‘further flexibility’, finally arrived later that evening after the two men had 
already concluded their meeting.82 
When Carter, Sadat and Begin eventually emerged from their seclusion at Camp 
David on 17 September to present twin framework agreements, the one for an Egyptian-
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Israeli peace treaty and the other for a comprehensive peace in the region, Callaghan wrote 
immediately to President Carter offering his warmest congratulations on an achievement 
which, he argued, owed much to the President’s personal dedication and determination. But 
he correctly identified the key remaining challenge, which would be gaining the backing of 
the moderate Arab governments, particularly Jordan, for the accords.83 But as far as King 
Hussein was concerned, the Camp David framework for the West Bank represented little 
more than the repackaging of the Begin Plan. His opposition to the agreement, which he 
regarded as providing a cover for a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, coupled with the 
failure to consult him before assigning significant responsibilities to Jordan in the document, 
meant that he ultimately refused to participate in the subsequent negotiations.84 
The close relationship Callaghan had developed with Begin, meanwhile, was in 
evidence once again in the wake of the Camp David summit when the Israeli Prime Minister 
decided to hold further talks with him during a stopover at Heathrow Airport on his return 
journey from the United States. The meeting consisted mainly of a long report from Begin on 
the summit, but Callaghan did make one creative suggestion to the effect that Begin might 
help Sadat and forestall the creation of a united Arab front against him by himself making a 
dramatic gesture towards Syria comparable to that which Sadat had made towards Israel. This 
might then help open up the possibility of King Hussein’s participation in the process. But 
while Begin described the idea as ‘very interesting’ nothing came of it.85 
Callaghan’s position on the controversial question of the expansion of Israeli 
settlements on the West Bank, which Carter had failed to resolve at Camp David, was soon 
tested again when Begin announced his decision on 26 October to “thicken” a number of 
existing settlements through the construction of additional housing units. Carter was 
personally incensed at the decision seeing it as a betrayal of the understanding he believed he 
had reached with Begin at Camp David over settlements.86 However, despite a request from 
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National Security Adviser Brzezinski that Callaghan should add his weight to the US pressure 
on Begin to rescind the move and despite a recommendation from the Foreign Secretary to the 
same effect, Callaghan declined to send the message to the Israeli Prime Minister which 
Owen had prepared for him. His Private Secretary Bryan Cartledge informed the Foreign 
Office that ‘the Prime Minister has concluded that by sending a message to Mr Begin along 
the lines proposed at this time, he would be using up political capital with the Israeli Prime 
Minister, which might be needed at a later stage, without any real prospect of causing Mr 
Begin to change his position’.87 But set against the backdrop of his earlier pressure on Sadat it 
is reasonable to conclude that Callaghan was in fact sympathetic to Begin’s position over the 
settlements. 
A further piece of evidence to this effect came the following spring when, against the 
backdrop of the final phase of the American-sponsored diplomacy aimed at concluding a 
bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Jordan brought forward a resolution to the UN Security 
Council condemning continued Israeli settlement activity and proposing the creation of a 
Security Council commission to report back on situation in the occupied territories. The 
Jordanian resolution reiterated the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the 
occupied territories under the terms of which Israeli settlement activity was illegal, a position 
which the British government had always supported in the past. Before the resolution came to 
a vote King Hussein wrote personally to Callaghan requesting British backing for it.88 
Although it was clear that the United States would abstain over the resolution, from 
Washington Ambassador Peter Jay recommended an approach of ‘measured independent-
mindedness’. He argued that ‘the US Administration will be neither surprised nor distressed if 
the United Kingdom votes in favour of the resolution’. Indeed, he even suspected ‘some 
among them… will not be sorry to see us take a firm line on the West Bank’. In the event, 
Callaghan once again decided otherwise. The UK Permanent representative at the UN was left 
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to perform verbal gymnastics in trying to explain how, while the UK had not departed from its 
established position that Israeli settlements were illegal under international law and a major 
obstacle to peace, still the UK would be abstaining over the resolution.89 Resolution 446 
nevertheless passed on 22 March 1979, with 12 votes in favour and only three abstentions (the 
UK, USA and Norway). Faced with the established British position regarding the illegality of 
the settlements, a personal appeal from King Hussein for support, and the advice of his 
Ambassador in Washington that a vote in favour of the resolution would not damage Anglo-
American relations, Callaghan nevertheless opted for abstention. From Amman Ambassador 
Urwick reported that he had been left in no doubt as to the Jordanian government’s 
disappointment over the vote, especially after the King’s personal appeal to the Prime 
Minister. ‘I think we are likely to hear a good deal more of the Jordanian argument that it is 
little good our welcoming the Egypt/Israel agreement as a first step in a comprehensive 
settlement if at the same time we condone Israeli moves in the occupied territories which 
make an ultimate settlement impossible’, wrote Urwick.90 In yet another meeting with Begin 
during his stopover at Heathrow the day after the Security Council vote, Callaghan told the 
Israeli leader in private that the UK did not support Israeli settlement policy.91 But the Prime 
Minister’s actions spoke louder than his words. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, therefore, that the Callaghan government was an 
outlier among British governments in its approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process. This was 
due in large measure to the personal predilections of the Prime Minister who both cultivated a 
close relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and departed from 
established principles of British foreign policy in effectively condoning Begin’s position over 
settlements in the occupied territories. The justification offered by Callaghan for his repeated 
refusal to take a stand on the issue of Israeli settlement policy was that he was accruing 
political capital with the Israeli leader which might be used at a later date. But if this was so, 
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the capital was never drawn down during the period of his administration. While it has been 
argued that with Wilson’s resignation, the Foreign Office was able to promote a more pro-
Arab policy under Callaghan, the evidence presented here suggests otherwise.92 Faced with 
the choice of supporting Begin’s position or that of the moderate Arab leaders Sadat and 
Hussein, Callaghan always chose the former. In his memoirs, written with the benefit of 
hindsight during the 1980s, Callaghan argued that ‘by his inflexibility… he [Begin] weakened 
Israel’s position in the world. His narrow view of Israel’s future failed to bind the people of 
Israel together, and despite the slaughter, he was later unable to achieve his purpose in 
Lebanon. Moreover, he was never able, as Sadat was, to take the broad view. Sadat was the 
bigger man of the two….’93 But this stood in stark contrast to the approach Callaghan had 
actually adopted while in office. 
In terms of Britain’s broader role in the Camp David peace process, Callaghan did 
provide personal support and advice which President Carter clearly found valuable. As the 
President put it in one phone conversation in February 1978, ‘you’ve been very helpful in the 
whole process, Jim, and I thank you for it.’94 Indeed, Callaghan’s role in absorbing some of 
Carter’s frustration at having to work with Begin was perhaps a case of the Anglo-American 
special relationship working at the level of consolation rather more than actual consultation. 
But Callaghan’s move closer to Begin came at the cost of damage to Britain’s relations with 
the more moderate Arab states meaning that the potential mediating role which Callaghan 
appeared to cherish early in 1978 was essentially a mirage. Callaghan was well advised by 
Foreign Office officials at this stage not to undertake his own journey to Jerusalem. 
If Callaghan left office in May 1979 with Britain’s relations with the Arab states under 
strain, the opposite was true of relations with Israel. Indeed, some of Prime Minister Begin’s 
frustration at Callaghan’s loss of office was most likely reflected in his extraordinary handling 
of his first meeting with Callaghan’s successor, Margaret Thatcher, a “confrontable” 
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exchange if ever there was one. According to the recollection of Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington, Begin delivered an unprovoked verbal tirade to the bemused Prime Minister: 
‘“you are responsible for the death of two million Jews at Auschwitz!” Margaret looked 
somewhat astonished. I suppose she had been aged about thirteen [sic] at the time in question. 
“You are responsible! Because you didn’t bomb the railway line!”’95 Thatcher subsequently 
described the meeting as ‘one of the most difficult she had experienced’, explaining that she 
had been unable to make any headway at all when she had raised the issue of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories.96 But then, this was hardly surprising since Begin had 
become accustomed to a rather different approach from her predecessor in office.97 
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